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Abstract 
The NASA Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) has defined several products that will 
potentially modi@ airline andor ATC operations, enhance aircraft systems, and improve the 
identification of potential hazardous situations within the National Airspace System (NAS). 
Consequently, there is a need to develop methods for evaluating the potential safety benefit of 
each of these intervention products so that resources can be effectively invested to produce the 
judgments to develop Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN's) that model the potential impact that 
specific interventions may have. Specifically, the present report summarizes methodologies for 
improving the elicitation of probability estimates during expert evaluations of AvSP products for 
use in BBN's. The work involved joint efforts between Professor James Luxhoj from Rutgers 
University and researchers at the University of Illinois. The Rutgers' project to develop BBN's 
received funding by NASA under contract NAS 1-03057 entitled "Probabilistic Decision Support 
for Evaluating Technology Insertion and Assessing Aviation Safety System Risk." The proposed 
project was funded separately but supported the existing Rutgers' program. 
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I biggest benefit to flight safety. Of interest to the present project is the process of using expert , 
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PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
The NASA Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) has defined several products that will 
potentially modify airline and/or ATC operations, enhance aircraft systems, and improve the 
identification of potential hazardous situations within the National Airspace System (NAS). 
Consequently, there is a need to develop methods for evaluating the potential safety benefit of 
each of these intervention products so that resources can be effectively invested to produce the 
biggest benefit to flight safety, The present project assisted in the evaluation AvSP interventions 
through joint efforts between researchers in Professor James Luxhoj ’s laboratory at Rutgers 
University and researchers at the University of Illinois. The Rutgers’ project focused heavily on 
the engineering components of Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN’s) that model the potential 
impact that specific interventions may have on safety. The Rutgers’ project is currently fhded  
by NASA under contract NAS1-03057. 
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The development of BBN’s, however, also involves a major psychological component, 
including experts’ subjective beliefs that can be biased by a variety of factors. Of interest to the 
present project, therefore, is the process of eliciting expert judgments for use in the development 
and subsequent validation of BBN’s. In this report we briefly summarize the potential problems 
associated with expert probability estimates and then provide a review of methods designed to 
overcome these problems. Finally, we present a tool developed as part of this project that 
integrates many of these improved elicitation methods. 
Brief Overview of Bayesian Belief Networks 
Bayesian Belief Networks were developed for representing and reasoning with 
uncertainty (Pearl, 1988) and have come into widespread use for decision support. These 
networks represent knowledge both qualitatively and quantitatively. The qualitative component 
consists of a directed graph, indicating which variables in the domain of interest influence others 
(Renooij, 2001). The variables are represented by nodes, and their influences on other variables 
are represented by arcs connecting the nodes. The quantitative part consists of the probabilities 
that a variable will assume each of its possible values, conditioned on the values of each of the 
variables that directly influence the variable of interest (Renooij, 2001). The probabilities 
represent the magnitudes of each variable’s influence. The qualitative structure of the network is 
determined with the help of domain experts. Some of the probabilities required for the 
quantitative part of the network can be determined by reference to databases and scientific 
literature (Renooij, 2001). However, many of the conditional probabilities required to quantify a 
belief network cannot be derived from those sources, so the probabilities must be elicited from 
domain experts, based on their knowledge and experience (Druzdzel & van der Gaag, 1995). 
There are many potential problems associated with eliciting probabilities from experts, 
which most often center on the issue of bias. The biases encountered during probability 
elicitation can be classified as either motivational, leading to the overconfidence bias, in which 
experts think they should be more certain about effects than they really are, or cognitive, due to 
the thought processes the experts use (Skinner, 1999; Renooij, 2001). Cognitive biases are often 
caused by experts’ use of the heuristics of availability, in which probability is determined based 
on how easy it is to recall events from memory; anchoring, in which probability is determined by 
starting with a pre-set value and adjusting up or down from it; representativeness, in which the 
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I I probability of one event leading to another is assessed based on the similarity between the two 
perceived control over its likelihood (Kahneman et al., 1982). The representativeness heuristic 
events; and control, in which the probability of an event occurring is based on the falsely 
can result in biases due to the conjunction fallacy, the gambler’s fallacy, and base-rate neglect. 
Other biases that may affect elicited probabilities are overestimation of single-event 
probabilities, conservatism, optimism, and fallacies of causal and diagnostic reasoning, in which 
causal data and inferences are given more weight than diagnostic data and inferences (Fenton, 
1998). 
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Methods for Improving Probability Elicitation 
There is a wide variety of elicitation methods designed to suppress or eliminate the biases 
associated with directly stating numerical probabilities. In this section, we will summarize the 
strengths and weaknesses of each approach. 
i 
Frequency Estimation Method. Stating probability elicitation questions in frequency 
format, in which experts are asked to state the number of times out of some multiple of 10 that 
they would expect an event to occur, given conditions set by the variables that influence the 
variable in question, suppresses overconfidence, base-rate neglect, the conjunction fallacy, 
control bias, and overestimation of single-event probabilities (Anderson, 1998; Gigerenzer & 
Hoffrage, 1995). Probability scales allow experts to mark probabilities on a graphic scale, which 
are fast and easy to understand; however, they tend to be inaccurate and prone to scaling biases 
(Renooij, 2001; von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986). In an attempt to remedy this situation, 
Renooij and Witteman (1 999) developed a scale with numerical anchors on one side and verbal 
probability anchors on the other side to allow experts to use the scale with which they are most 
comfortable for each question. 
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Gamble Methods. Probabilities can also be determined using two gamble-like methods. 
In the certain-equivalent method, the expert chooses either a certain payoff or a lottery where the 
payoff depends on the probability in question, and the elicitor adjusts the amount of the certain 
payoff until the expert is indifferent between the two choices. In the lottery-equivalent method, 
the expert chooses either a lottery where the outcome depends on a probability set by the elicitor 
or a lottery where the outcome depends on the probability in question. Gamble-like methods 
suffer from a high time cost, can be hard to conceive due to rare or unethical hypothetical 
situations that must be considered in some cases, and the certain-equivalent method is subject to 
risk attitude effects, which are reduced in the lottery-equivalent method (Renooij, 2001). Another 
gamble-like method, the probability wheel, is a pie chart with a spinnable pointer and red and 
green sections that the elicitor adjusts until the expert thinks that the probability of the pointer 
landing in the red section is equivalent to the probability in question. There are no risk attitude 
effects, but since the method is very close to direct estimation, it may be subject to the same 
biases, and the time cost may be too high (Renooij, 2001). 
Hierarchical Methods. Druzdzel and van der Gaag (1 995) developed a method to allow 
experts to provide either qualitative or quantitative information, whichever they were most 
comfortable providing. They then used the information to define a system of @)equalities 
limiting the set of possible joint probability distributions and derived second-order probability 
distributions to determine the most likely true joint distribution. This method avoids biases 
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because experts are not forced to provide numerical probabilities, and it allows detection of 
inconsistent information that can be refined with further elicitation. Monti and Carenini (2000) 
adapted the Analytical Hierarchy Process for use in belief network probability elicitation. 
Probabilities are derived from comparisons of the likelihood of each possible pair of events, 
bypassing direct elicitation biases. Because of the redundancy of the method, it is easy to 
compute the consistency of the expert’s responses and provide immediate feedback to the expert 
for refinement. However, the number of comparisons required far exceeds the number of 
probabilities to be assessed, many events are so different that they are hard to compare, and it is 
hard to determine the acceptability of the expert’s consistency based on the statistical methods 
used (Monti & Carenini, 2000; Renooij, 2001). 
A few studies have compared some of these varied methods for eliciting expert 
judgments. For example, Wang, Dash, and Druzdzel (2002) compared direct numerical 
elicitation with the probability wheel and the scaled probability bar and found that accuracy and 
speed were highest with scaled probability bars, followed by the probability wheel. Whitcomb, 
Onkal, Benson, and Curley (1993) found that for direct numerical elicitation, odds, and the 
probability wheel, test-retest reliability was high within and between all of the methods. The 
results of existing studies have often been inconsistent, however. Indeed “What is lacking are 
large multi-method studies where experts are asked to assess a large number of probabilities with 
every single method” (Renooij, 2001, p. 268). There is a need to determine which methods are 
best, or whether certain methods work better in different contexts (e.g., individual or group 
settings). 
Using Multiple Experts 
Using more than one expert for probability elicitation is believed to increase the accuracy 
of the final probabilities by balancing multiple viewpoints and drawing from a larger pool of 
knowledge. The two major ways of combining the probabilities from multiple experts are 
aggregating individual assessments and group consensus. In most cases, aggregating by simple 
averaging works well, but more complex modeling rules can be applied if information about the 
quality of and dependence among the experts’ assessments is available (Clemen & Winkler, 
1999). Information about the quality of assessments can be collected using seed variables, for 
which the true probabilities are known (Roelen, Wever, Hale, Goossens, Cooke, Lopuhaa, 
Simons, & Valk, 2002). However, caution should be used, since the sensitivity of complex 
modeling rules can eliminate their advantages over simple averaging and often results in worse 
performance (Clemen & Winkler, 1999). Expert consensus has the advantage over aggregating 
probabilities from individual assessments that the experts share their knowledge, and Clemen 
and Winkler (1999) conclude that this method works almost as well as mathematical 
aggregation. However, expert consensus introduces potential problems and biases associated 
with group interaction (Renooij, 2001). Clemen and Winkler (1 999) suggest that eliciting and 
aggregating individual assessments after group interaction, rather than forcing the group to come 
to consensus, allows knowledge sharing without group interaction problems. 
Further work is still needed to determine the best method for assessing probabilities from 
multiple experts for belief networks. None of the studies reviewed by Clemen and Winkler 
(1999) involved field application of the techniques studied, and the authors were only able to 
outline general rules concerning which techniques to use in the field. Roelen et al. (2002) used 
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the Classical Model to combine expert judgments because it conformed to the rules they set forth 
for expert judgment techniques: scrutability, performance control, neutrality, and fairness, 
though it would seem that many other combination techniques would meet those requirements, 
as well. Thus, empirical results from field studies comparing all of the combination techniques 
feasible for use in Bayesian Belief Networks are needed to determine which is best or to define 
explicit guidelines for determining which to use in any given situation. 
Another potential problem in selecting and using experts is their nature of expertise, 
which is generally not addressed in the literature, given the domains usually studied. In the 
context of aviation and aviation technologies, particularly when human factors issues are 
involved, criteria for determining expertise may vary. Is it better to use experts in industry and 
operations or to use experts in human factors and technologies affecting human performance, or 
both? Winkler and Poses (1993) compared all possible simple average combinations of 
probabilities elicited from four individuals working in an intensive care unit on the probability of 
survival of each patient and found that the best combination was the two most experienced, yet 
least similar people in their area of expertise. Clemen and Winkler (1999) conclude that it is best 
to use experts who differ from each other in terms of viewpoint and knowledge to minimize 
redundant information and maximize the effectiveness of aggregation. They also conclude that 
the optimum number of experts to use is three to five. Therefore, it seems that using experts from 
both the industry/operations and human factors areas will provide the best results. 
Transitioning to Field Applications 
Most of the research on probability elicitation for Bayesian Belief Networks discuss the 
process in conceptual form or detail the methods for experimental implementation, but few 
provide a protocol for field implementation. Renooij (2001) gives a five-stage process and 
explains what is involved with each stage and the various elicitation methods that can be used 
but does not enumerate specific procedures and methods that should be used. Roelen et al. 
(2002) give a protocol used for building an aviation safety model and explain in detail how they 
performed each step. They report that the protocol resulted in a workable belief network but were 
somewhat disappointed in the poor calibration of the individual experts. This may be due in part 
to their elicitation method, which forced the experts to give frequencies for the 5th, 50th, and 
95th quartiles. Though the questions and the answers were generally in frequency format, the use 
of quartiles, asking the experts to determine values they were 5%, 50%, and 95% certain were 
greater than the actual value, made the technique vulnerable to the biases associated with direct 
numerical elicitation of probabilities (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Wang, Dash, & Druzdzel, 
2002). To date, there have been few field studies to determine the best way to apply the methods 
explained in the literature to field use, including the best methods for probability elicitation and 
combining the experts’ judgments. 
The Rutgers’ Elicitation Tool 
Researchers at Rutgers University in consultation with the human factors team at the 
University of Illinois developed The GRID Feedback Workbook to aid in the elicitation of 
probabilities by aviation safety experts. Specifically, The tool was created to elicit the judgment 
of the experts as they envisioned the AvSP products influencing the risk level of the various 
accident precursors used in a risk management model. 
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The workbook is arranged with precursors down the left-hand column and products listed 
across the top row (see Figure 1). All precursor names and technology names are hyperlinked to 
a definition page in the workbook. The precursors are defined and a simple example given in 
many instances for clarity. The technology products are defined from the AvSP Product 
Dictionary and most of the definitions in the GRID Feedback Workbook contain graphic 
Powerpoint slides for fluency. Each of the technology products has two entry cells for the 
precursors, one for direct effect and one for indirect effects. (Due to the absence of a system 
structure, such as the BBN model, the effects must be elicited as direct and indirect to represent 
parent and grandparent nodes.) 
Figure 1. Sample Page from the Rutgers' GRLD Feedback Workbook. 
Within the workbook, products are grouped according to the suites as outlined in the AvSP. 
Users of the workbook complete the GRID for their particular product expertise. They are 
instructed to: 
"Enter a number between 0-1 in the cell intersection of AvSP Product and Causal Factor 
to represent the projected impact on safety risk reduction. Both Direct and Indirect Efects can 
be considered, but they will be scored separately. The rank for a product's efect on each causal 
factor and accident type is based upon your estimate of a relative risk reduction (i.e., i fa product 
will reduce likelihood of a causal factor occurring by 25%, rating = 0.25). '' 
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, This tool was specifically designed to integrate a variety of methods for improving the 
elicitation probabilities described previously. For example, it provides instructions that restate 
I probability elicitation questions in frequency format, which has shown to suppress 
single-event probabilities (Anderson, 1998; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). Second, it uses 
numerical anchors on one side and verbal probability anchors on the other side to allow experts 
to use the scale with which they are most comfortable for each question. This approach has been 
shown to reduce scaling biases (Renooij, 2001; von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986; Renooij & 
elicitation, which is believed to increase the accuracy of the final probabilities by balancing 
multiple viewpoints and drawing from a larger pool of knowledge (Clemen & Winkler, 1999). 
attempting to achieve consensus as a group. As stated earlier, expert consensus can introduce 
potential problems and biases associated with group interaction (Renooij, 200 1). Hence, eliciting 
and aggregating individual assessments after group interaction, rather than forcing the group to 
come to consensus, allows knowledge sharing without group interaction problems (Clemen & 
Winkler, 1999). As such, this GRID Feedback Workbook should serve as a valuable tool for 
generating reliable estimates from experts concerning the impact that each NASA product may 
have on improving aviation safety in the future. 
I 
I 
I overconfidence, base-rate neglect, the conjunction fallacy, control bias, and overestimation of 
I Witteman 1999). In addition, the tool allows for the use of more than one expert for probability 
Finally, the tool allows individual experts to generate estimates independently rather than 
I 
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Conclusion 
The NASA Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) has defined several products that will 
potentially modify airline and/or ATC operations, enhance aircraft systems, and improve the 
identification of potential hazardous situations within the National Airspace System (NAS). 
Consequently, there is a need to develop methods for evaluating the potential safety benefit of 
each of these intervention products so that resources can be effectively invested to produce the 
biggest benefit to flight safety. Of interest to the present project is the process of using expert 
judgments to develop Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN’s) that model the potential impact that 
specific interventions may have. Specifically, the present report summarizes methodologies for 
improving the elicitation of probability estimates during expert evaluations of AvSP products for 
use in Bayesian Belief Networks. A specific tool for generating expert estimations developed as 
part of collaborative efforts between engineers at Rutgers University and human factors 
researchers at the University of Illinois. 
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